“It’s time to put an end to this”. A study of how Russians perceive the meaning of the war and Russian and Ukrainian attitudes toward a ceasefire
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Release #36, June 22, 2026
Introduction
This release is based on the study “Meanings of the War” conducted by ExtremeScan in March 2026 in Russia and Ukraine in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.
Russia. A telephone survey representative of the adult population aged 18 and over. Sample size: 1,607 respondents. Sampling methodology: Random Digit Dialing (RDD) based on Roskomsvyaz data, stratified by federal districts and the two federal cities. Estimated margin of error: 2.44% at a 95% confidence interval.
Ukraine. A telephone survey representative of the adult population aged 18 and over, excluding Crimea and the territories in southern and eastern Ukraine under Russian control. Sample size: 1,204 respondents. Sampling methodology: RDD proportional to the market shares of the main mobile operators – Kyivstar, Vodafone, and Lifecell.
Additional sources included data from ExtremeScan’s “Ceasefire” study conducted in February – March 2026 in Russia and Ukraine, other ExtremeScan studies, data from the “Chronicles” project, and data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS).
One of the main objectives of the study was to understand how Russians perceive the so-called “Special Military Operation” (SMO) after more than four years of war and what meaning they attach to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
What is the SMO to me: my cause or not my concern?
Respondents were asked to choose one of three alternatives:
The SMO is a common cause to which I feel personally connected.
The SMO is a matter of the state that should be handled by the military.
The SMO is an event into which people were drawn as a result of a political decision.
The “Involved”
37% believe that the SMO is a common cause to which they feel personally connected.
Apparently, this wording reflects support for the SMO more accurately than direct questions about support, where approximately half of respondents have consistently expressed support throughout most of the war.
Only 60% of those who feel “personally involved” actually support the SMO. Among men aged 18-60 in this group, 65% express a nominal willingness to participate in military operations. However, only one-third have actually attempted to enlist as volunteers, which does not distinguish them from other men who view the war as someone else’s cause.
The “Detached”
53% of respondents do not feel personally connected to the special military operation. For them, it is either the responsibility of the state and the military (25%), or a political decision into which people were drawn against their will.
60% of this group would support Putin’s decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and begin peace negotiations, although the stated objectives have not been achieved. This is understandable: those objectives were either unknown to them or were never their own personal goals.
Previous studies repeatedly identified this same sense of detachment. For example, there has always been a gap between perceptions of what the war means for the state and what it means for the individual. Half of the respondents believed that victory would bring benefits to the state, while only 15% expected any personal benefit from victory. This is unsurprising, as the negative consequences of the war continue to accumulate irreversibly.
How has the war affected respondents, their families, and Russia as a whole
A small qualitative study conducted in late February 2026 revealed a state of prolonged anxiety and fatigue that has gradually given way to adaptation and emotional numbness. As one focus-group participant remarked: “Human beings are such creatures who can get used to anything.”
In the quantitative survey, a larger share of respondents reported anxiety (50%) than calmness (43%). However, even “calmness” often reflects indifference and apathy. As one respondent explained: “The more you immerse yourself in it, the more anxious thoughts appear, and the more you want to limit that flow... To live as if you didn’t know about all of this.”
38% believe Russian society has become less fair during the war, while 24% believe it has become more fair. 12% noticed no change.
A qualitative study conducted in 2024 identified five major issues viewed as the price paid for the SMO:
Human losses.
Rising military spending amid declining living standards.
The consequences of sanctions.
Tougher legislation, higher taxes, and Internet restrictions.
Repression against those who oppose the war.
Importantly, by early 2026, respondents’ spontaneous lists of current problems increasingly included new everyday concerns: power outages, heating disruptions, water supply problems, fuel shortages, disruptions to airport operations, disruptions to railway services.
We examined most of these issues in the quantitative study. Overall, respondents assess the impact of the SMO on everyday life as predominantly negative: 48% say life has worsened, 11% say it has improved, and 32% report no change.
This overall perception is composed of many factors. Over the past two years, the proportion of respondents reporting a deterioration in their financial situation has doubled – from 20% in January 2024 to 41% in March 2026. During the same period, the share reporting an improvement in their financial situation fell from 20% to 13%. According to 55% of respondents, the country’s economic situation has worsened since the beginning of the special military operation. For 25%, it has remained the same, and for 11%, it has improved. Even among respondents whose personal financial circumstances improved, optimism about the national economy is only slightly higher, at 23%.
What impact has the war had over the past year on living conditions in respondents’ cities and districts, and on the lives of respondents and their families
The geographic spread of missile strikes and drone attacks has widened. Overall, 49% of respondents said their own towns or cities had been affected: 83% in the Southern Federal District, 66% in the Central District, 59% in the Volga District, 50% in the North Caucasus, and 45% in the North-West. Other parts of the country were affected to a lesser extent.
This captures the geography of the attacks. The next step is to measure their intensity. Research shows that when respondents witness drone raids in their town or city as something happening “somewhere over there,” it does not affect their attitude toward the war. But when strikes occur close by – with environmental damage and other direct consequences – support begins to erode.
Disruptions to airports and rail services were reported by 33% of respondents. Power outages affected 37%, while 15% experienced heating problems. Fuel shortages at filling stations were reported by half of all drivers of private or work vehicles – equivalent to 20% of the adult population overall. Shortages of medicines in pharmacies and hospitals were reported by 18%. This is a fairly stable share and, relatively speaking, not yet a critical one. Even so, problems with access to medicines significantly reduce support for the “special military operation” from 54% to 42%.
Digital restrictions
The intrusion of the war into the everyday private lives of virtually everyone was most acutely felt in the sphere of digital restrictions.
Mobile internet shutdowns affected 77% of respondents.
Messenger apps were blocked for 63% – and that was already the figure in the first half of March, before these disruptions intensified further.
When asked which restrictions linked to the war had affected them most, 47% cited limits on online services. Support for the SMO was markedly lower among those dissatisfied with these restrictions: 41%, compared with 71% among those who had not experienced their effects.
Further evidence of the negative impact of digital restrictions on people’s lives can be seen in attempts to shield themselves from them: VPN use rose by 9 percentage points, from 27% in October 2025 to 36% in March 2026.
Impact on people’s plans
In earlier research, we asked respondents about their ability to plan for the future. The planning horizon has contracted sharply: the war has, in effect, stripped people of the ability to make long-term plans, because there are no clear goals, timeframes, or points of reference. Survival is increasingly becoming the overriding priority – and survival demands a focus on the present rather than the future. There is also a growing sense that life is already being mapped out by forces beyond one’s control. Constant uncertainty – mobilisation, drone attacks, new laws, and new restrictions – makes any kind of planning feel precarious.
We asked respondents whether the “special military operation” had forced them to postpone any plans. Across the sample as a whole, half said they had either put plans on hold or abandoned them altogether. Crucially, this affected above all the most active segment of the population – those aged 18 to 49 – among whom the share rose to 60%. A third of younger respondents said they had postponed family plans, plans to have a child, housing-related plans, trips and travel, or major purchases.
Among these respondents, support for the SMO stood at 35-38%, compared with 66% among those whose plans had not changed (including those who had no plans to begin with). People who had postponed plans were almost three times more likely to describe the impact of the war as negative than those whose plans had not been affected: on average, 80% versus 29%.
Human losses
The gravest consequences of the war have been the losses suffered by families with relatives involved in the fighting. The share of families with men who have taken part, or are currently taking part, in combat in Ukraine rose from 15% in May 2022 to 23% in February 2023, following the autumn 2022 mobilisation. By March 2026, that figure had reached 32%.
In half of those families – equivalent to 16% of all respondents and their family networks – at least one relative had been killed, wounded, or gone missing. It is important to note that “family” here refers not only to the immediate household but to a wider kinship network of roughly 25 people, including uncles, nephews, cousins, and relatives on a spouse’s side.
For comparison, in Ukraine, relatives have taken part or are taking part in the fighting in 67% of families.
Ending the war: desire and pessimism
The “Meanings of the War” also serves as the second wave of a study of attitudes toward a ceasefire in Russia and Ukraine after four years of war. In both countries, respondents are pessimistic about the prospects for a ceasefire in the near future.
In Russia, the survey recorded the lowest level yet of belief that the war will end within the next few months or within half a year. In March 2025, at the height of hopes that “Trump is on our side” and would help deliver a ceasefire, 43% of respondents believed the war would end soon. A year later, in March 2026, that figure had fallen to just 14%.
Figure 1. Russians’ expectations about the duration of the war. Source: ExtremeScan, Chronicles project.
Ukrainians are similarly pessimistic about the prospects of the faltering peace talks. In February 2025, 32% of Ukrainians expected a ceasefire within the next few months or half-year. A year later, that share had fallen to 24%.
Polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) shows similar numbers.
“Do you believe that the current negotiations will lead to a lasting peace in Ukraine, or not?”
Only 25% said yes, compared with 70% who said no.
The hopes invested in Trump at the peak of his diplomatic activism were so strong that, by the end of 2025, they had curdled into deep disappointment in both countries at war.
Russian respondents want peace
If a peace agreement were to be signed in the coming months – meaning that Russia would stop military operations in Ukraine rather than continue them in pursuit of further territorial gains – the most common reaction among Russians would be one of relief and hope, cited by 53% of respondents.
These are the most widespread emotions across virtually all groups surveyed, including those who support the “special military operation” (46%), those who say it has had a positive impact on their lives (47%), and those whose material circumstances have improved as a result of it (58%).
These respondents also expect stress levels to decrease and living conditions to improve. Unsurprisingly, however, feelings of relief and expectations of reduced stress are even stronger among those whose lives and financial circumstances have worsened as a result of the war, as well as among those who see the SMO as a political decision imposed on the country.
At the same time, around 20% of the sample say they would feel disappointment because the stated goals of the SMO had not been achieved, while a similar share expect new difficulties to follow. This sentiment is more common among respondents who support the “special military operation” and who feel personally invested in it (29%).
As noted above, individual ceasefire terms, when considered in isolation and outside a broader settlement framework, tend to elicit harder-line responses and do not necessarily reflect how people would react to a comprehensive agreement. Nevertheless, such questions provide valuable insight.
Overall willingness to accept compromise
As we have already noted, individual ceasefire terms, when taken in isolation and stripped of context, tend to elicit harder responses and do not necessarily reflect how people would react to a negotiated settlement as a whole. Even so, they remain analytically useful
In both the February 2026 “Meanings of the War” survey and the February 2025 Ceasefire survey, Ukrainian respondents, when presented with a binary choice in isolation, consistently preferred a longer war to abandoning efforts to regain occupied territory.
“Option 1: To achieve an immediate ceasefire, Ukraine could forgo the military liberation of territories occupied since 2022.
Option 2: Ukraine should not give up the goal of regaining its territories by military means, even if that means the war will last longer.”
A year later, despite the human and material costs of the war, attitudes on this question had become even more hard-line.
2025: 37-52 = -15 (share choosing the first option minus the share choosing the second)
2026: 29-56 = -27
In other words, even though both the negotiating narrative and official rhetoric in Ukraine moved considerably away from the idea of retaking occupied territories by military force during 2025 and early 2026, and despite growing war fatigue, resistance to territorial compromise doubled over the course of the year.
As the territorial dimension of the conflict has increasingly come to centre on Donbas, assessing ceasefire scenarios requires a closer look at how important this issue remains to both sides.
Another question, asked by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), explored this issue further:
“Ukraine withdraws its troops from the territories of Donbas that it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, etc., and these territories pass under Russian control. In return, the USA and Europe give Ukraine security guarantees.”
Figure 2. Source KIIS.
Thus, despite the strong priority placed on security and the deeply felt desire for peace, the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the remaining part of Donbas is not merely unacceptable to Ukrainians; that rejection has been growing – not only over the past year, but even over the much shorter span of the last three months.
For Russians, by contrast, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine is a more acceptable option than a Ukrainian pullback from the current line of military contact is for Ukrainians.
In Russia, the picture looks different. In March 2026, 45% of respondents (compared with 40% who opposed it) said they would support Putin's decision to withdraw Russian troops from Ukrainian territory and pursue peace negotiations, even if the war's declared goals had not been achieved.
And even Donbas – cast by Putin as the central objective of the “special military operation” and as the symbolic marker of victory – is far from a dominant priority for Russians.
The same pattern was already visible in September 2025. Respondents were asked:
“Would you support or oppose fixing the border along the current line of military contact if that would make it possible to stop the fighting?”
Among Russian respondents, 57% said they would support such a decision, while 19% said they would oppose it.
A similar result emerged in August 2024, during the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region and Russia’s simultaneous offensive in Donbas, when the question arose of whether Russian forces should be redeployed from Donbas to Kursk region. Respondents were asked:
“In your opinion, what is the more important objective for the Russian army today: expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk region, or advancing in Donbas?”
In September 2024, 53% said that retaking Kursk region was the greater priority, while only 15% named Donbas.
For the past year and a half, 64–65% of respondents in Russia have consistently supported reaching a ceasefire through mutual concessions.
Across different stages of the war and across differently worded survey questions, the finding remains the same: for Russians, the value of achieving full control over the administrative territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions – which has become Putin’s central demand – is far lower than the desire to secure a ceasefire and obtain security guarantees.
Scenarios as a tool for identifying room for compromise
In our mirror study of ceasefire attitudes in Russia and Ukraine in 2026, we again used a scenario-based approach, as we had in 2025. Respondents were asked to assess the acceptability of a scenario made up of four conditions.
As the release accompanying the first wave of the study put it:
“Scenario-based surveys make it possible to understand people’s attitudes toward a ceasefire far more accurately than conventional survey questions. When respondents are asked a single question in isolation – for example, “Do you support troop withdrawal?” or “What matters more: territory or security?” – the result is a fairly abstract position. In that format, people respond on the basis of general attitudes or emotions, without taking into account the consequences or the costs of the decision.
In real politics, any agreement is always a package of interlocking terms: territory, security, sanctions, and economic consequences. These elements are connected, and it makes little sense to consider them separately. Scenario-based surveys reproduce that logic: respondents are asked to evaluate a complete settlement option that they can either accept or reject. This makes it possible to capture compromise: what people are willing to accept in order to end the war, and what they regard as unacceptable. As a result, what we obtain are not abstract declarations but choices that are much closer to real-world decision-making.
Time and again, responses to simple standalone questions diverge from reactions to concrete scenarios: support for some positions falls once their costs become explicit, while others, by contrast, emerge as clear red lines. That is precisely why a scenario-based approach offers a more accurate picture of the real boundaries of publicly acceptable settlements.
The number of conditions included in a scenario is constrained by respondents’ ability to keep four elements in mind at once. The scenario is designed to be broadly universal, so that it can be presented to respondents in both countries at war.
An analysis of the content of the negotiations showed that the most salient ceasefire parameters in both countries are security and territory. Security – and therefore an end to the fighting – is the clear priority.”
From the perspective of Ukrainian respondents, the key conditions for peace negotiations with Russia should include security guarantees from NATO countries (40%), while only 11% support fixing the border along the current line of military contact.
In March 2026, when Russian respondents were asked to choose between two alternatives – Russia obtaining full control over Donbas or Ukraine receiving security guarantees from Western countries – a majority opted for security guarantees (51%). Full control over Donbas was prioritised by 34%.
Questions of this kind made it possible to identify the parameters to be incorporated into the survey scenarios.
The principle of scenario realism
The scenarios were constructed within the bounds of politically plausible outcomes, rather than as an exercise in abstract theoretical combinatorics. We deliberately excluded extreme options – such as a full return to Ukraine’s 2014 borders or the capitulation of one side – because these scenarios do not align with the current configuration of political positions.
By early 2026, the territorial dimension of the conflict had, in effect, narrowed to the Donbas, which remains the central symbolic and political element on the negotiating agenda. Accordingly, the scenarios vary primarily around Donbas: from consolidating the current line of contact to changes in territorial control and demilitarisation.
The security component is likewise built around mechanisms that are actually under discussion: guarantees from the United States, the involvement of Western countries, the possible deployment of a Western military contingent on Ukrainian territory, and the reform of the Ukrainian armed forces.
February 2025: Russia
A year earlier, in February 2025, the mirror study identified the following scenario as commanding the broadest consensus.
Consensus scenario, February 2025
Russia retains control over all territories currently under its occupation (“although Ukraine does not formally recognise this” – in the Ukrainian version of the scenario).
Ukraine receives credible security guarantees from Western countries in the form of a military contingent stationed along the line of demarcation.
Ukraine receives the funding needed for economic reconstruction from Western countries.
Western sanctions on Russia are lifted gradually.
This scenario was supported by 60% of respondents in Russia and opposed by 29%; in Ukraine, it was supported by 62% and opposed by 34%.
March 2026: Russia
Among the three ceasefire scenarios presented to respondents in Russia, the first received the highest level of support: 68% were willing to accept it, while 15% were unwilling.
Scenario One
Russia retains control over all territories it currently occupies, and the border is fixed along the existing line of military contact.
Ukraine signs an agreement with the United States providing reliable security guarantees and formally renounces NATO membership.
Ukraine receives the funding necessary for economic reconstruction from Western countries.
Western sanctions against Russia are gradually lifted.
The final two conditions – Ukraine’s reconstruction and the gradual lifting of sanctions – were identical across all three scenarios.
It is important to note that this scenario assumes the border remains along the existing line of contact. In other words, it does not involve continuing military operations in order to achieve full control over the administrative territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. This finding is consistent with results from various other survey questions.
In autumn 2025, respondents were asked: “Would you support or oppose fixing the borders along the current line of military contact if this would stop the fighting?” 57% answered “support”, 19% answered “oppose.”
The significance of Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership for Russian respondents was already evident a year earlier. Mentioning this condition increases support for the scenario.
Scenario Two
The second most popular option was a scenario in which the Ukrainian-controlled part of Donbas becomes a demilitarised zone.
Russia retains control over all territories it currently occupies, while the Ukrainian-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts become a demilitarised zone.
The United States guarantees Ukraine’s security and oversees compliance with the ceasefire agreement by both sides.
Results: 61% acceptable, 25% unacceptable.
Scenario Three
Ukraine withdraws its troops, and Russia gains control over the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as well as the currently occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts.
Western countries guarantee compliance with the ceasefire through a military contingent stationed along the line of separation and finance the modernisation of the Ukrainian armed forces.
Results: 54% acceptable, 32% unacceptable.
For Russian respondents, obtaining full control of Donbas without Ukraine renouncing NATO membership proved less attractive than either turning the disputed territory into a demilitarised zone or maintaining the current line of control. To clarify, this finding refers specifically to Russian respondents.
As a result, the territorial issue produces somewhat paradoxical results. The most acceptable option is fixing the border along the existing line of contact. Second is transforming the remaining Ukrainian-controlled part of Donbas into a demilitarized zone. Third is the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops and the transfer of all of Donbas to Russian control.
This illustrates how scenario-based research works. One element can offset – or even outweigh – another. It is possible that this ranking reflects the inclusion of Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership and the role of Trump’s signature as guarantor, which, despite widespread distrust, is still perceived as a powerful guarantee of a ceasefire.
February 2026: Ukraine
After a year of failed hopes and Trump’s “peace-making efforts,” Ukrainian attitudes became substantially more hardline.
In February 2026, however, the most acceptable scenario for Ukrainians turned out to be the same one that ranked highest among Russians.
Scenario 1: the current line of contact as the border + a Ukraine–US agreement + no NATO membership
Russia retains control over all territories it currently occupies.
Ukraine signs an agreement with the United States providing reliable security guarantees and formally renounces NATO membership.
Ukraine receives the funding necessary for economic reconstruction from Western countries.
Western sanctions against Russia are gradually lifted.
Results: acceptable to 49% of Ukrainians, unacceptable to 41%.
Scenario 2: a demilitarised Donbas + US guarantees for the ceasefire terms
Nearly the same level of support was recorded for the following scenario:
Russia retains control over all territories it currently occupies, while the Ukrainian-controlled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts become a demilitarised zone.
The United States guarantees Ukraine’s security and ensures compliance with the ceasefire agreement by both sides.
Results: acceptable to 47%, unacceptable to 41%.
Scenario Three
Ukraine withdraws its troops, and Russia gains control over the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, along with the currently occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts.
Western countries guarantee compliance with the ceasefire through a military contingent stationed along the line of separation and finance the modernisation of the Ukrainian armed forces.
Results: acceptable to 37%, unacceptable to 51%.
Withdrawal from Donbas is unacceptable to most Ukrainians. Even the presence of Western military contingents and the modernisation of the Ukrainian army does not compensate for this concession.
We compared the average levels of acceptance and rejection across all four scenarios in 2025 and across the three scenarios tested in 2026, producing an aggregate index of respondents’ willingness or unwillingness to accept a given scenario and bring the fighting to an end.
Country | Year | Acceptable | Unacceptable |
Russia | 2025 | 48% | 42% |
2026 | 63% | 23% | |
Ukraine | 2025 | 56% | 38% |
2026 | 44% | 44% |
Table 1. Average level of support and opposition to ceasefire scenarios in Russia and Ukraine in 2025 and 2026. Source: ExtremeScan, March 2025 and March 2026.
The study reveals a substantial shift in willingness to accept ceasefire terms. In Russia, the readiness to accept such conditions increased by roughly 1.5 times. In Ukraine, by contrast, it declined. One year after Trump’s return to power and the launch of his peace initiative, the study observes a growing radicalisation of attitudes in Ukraine.
What Happened Over the Past Year in Russia?
In Russia, fatigue continues to grow due to what many respondents perceive as a meaningless war, ongoing uncertainty, and an inability to make plans for the future. Additional factors contributing to this fatigue include: shelling and drone attacks across roughly half of Russia’s territory; deteriorating personal financial circumstances; digital restrictions; a growing proportion of families with relatives serving at the front (rising from 15% to 33% over three years); a growing share of respondents whose relatives have been killed, wounded, or gone missing (16%).
These sentiments are reflected in a significant decline in support for government policies across multiple domains: foreign, domestic, economic, and social policy. Over the past six months, even Putin’s traditionally “Teflon” approval ratings have begun to decline. In the fifth year of the war, the study argues, there are no longer any factors capable of generating increased support for the war or boosting government approval ratings. As a result, the observed trends appear irreversible. The accumulation of negative experiences has led to a greater willingness among Russians to accept compromises in order to bring the war to an end.
Figure 3. Public polling data from VTsIOM and FOM, 2025–2026.
What Happened Over the Past Year in Ukraine?
The humanitarian and socio-economic consequences of the war in Ukraine are extensive and not comparable to those experienced in Russia.
Consequences of the war | Share of respondents |
Hunger | 5% |
Loss or destruction of home/property | 18% |
Deterioration of health | 71% |
Death of relatives | 35% |
Reduction or loss of regular income/job loss | 62% |
Mobilization into the Armed Forces of Ukraine | 42% |
Family separation | 47% |
Severe psychological trauma or distress | 76% |
Occupation of hometown/locality | 16% |
Serious problems caused by electricity outages | 49% |
Table 2. Source: ExtremeScan, March 2026.
This is far from a complete list. The word “fatigue”, often used when discussing Russians, seems inadequately mild when applied to Ukrainians.
According to KIIS data, willingness to continue enduring the war has returned from the 62-65% levels recorded earlier to approximately 52-54%, similar to the levels observed in late 2024 and early 2025.
One might therefore expect Ukrainians to become more willing to compromise on the central issue today – Donbas. However, a separate question in the “Meanings of the War” study suggests otherwise: 56% of Ukrainians remain unwilling to abandon efforts to regain their territories in exchange for an immediate ceasefire.
When security guarantees are offered as the price of compromise within the scenarios, many Ukrainians are unwilling to trust those guarantees when they come from sources they regard as unreliable. The past “Trump year” has generated too many disappointments in the peace process.
Ukrainians approve of Zelensky’s negotiating position. 69% support his conduct in the negotiations. Respondents believe that Zelensky has made genuine efforts toward peace, yet they also feel that he – and, by extension, Ukraine itself – has been subjected to humiliation, has faced Trump’s unpredictability, and has witnessed what they perceive as Trump’s clear sympathy for Putin. As a result, an “American-style” peace process has become discredited in the eyes of many Ukrainians.
Response | Total | Trust Trump | Do not trust Trump |
To achieve an immediate ceasefire, Ukraine may abandon efforts to liberate by military means the territories occupied after 2022 | 29% | 42% | 28% |
Ukraine should not abandon efforts to regain its territories by military means, even if the war lasts longer | 56% | 49% | 59% |
Difficult to answer / refusal | 14% | 9% | 13% |
Table 3. Source: ExtremeScan, March 2026.
Among the 8% of Ukrainians who trust Trump, willingness to consider territorial compromises is substantially higher (42%). Among the 85% who do not trust Trump, only 28% are prepared to contemplate abandoning military efforts to liberate occupied territories.
Distrust of Trump extends beyond the individual and influences perceptions of the United States as a whole. This creates a fundamental difference between respondents who believe Ukraine should orient itself strategically toward Europe and those who favour partnership with the United States.
Above, we demonstrated the overall scenario acceptability index. Among respondents with a pro-European orientation – who constitute the majority of the sample (63%) – the overall scenario acceptability index is 43%. Among pro-American respondents (12% of the sample), the figure reaches 73%.
What happened to attitudes toward ceasefire conditions in Ukraine?
Comparison with the February 2025 indices shows that, despite the inevitable bias of the proposed scenarios toward Russian preferences, Ukrainians were considerably more willing to compromise one year earlier. This remained true even after the attempted public humiliation of the Ukrainian president in the Oval Office in February 2025.
Over the course of the year, the situation changed. The initiative in the negotiations and the very organization of the talks were the prerogative of Donald Trump, who sided with Russia. The conduct of the American would-be peacemaker had a radicalising effect on Ukrainian public opinion.
In the 2026 wave, we tried to keep the scenarios as close as possible to the wording used in 2025. But in the case of Ukraine, we underestimated the degree to which Trump had become politically toxic. In Ukrainian society, and among experts, Trump’s peace initiatives have increasingly come to be associated with a sense of betrayal, fears of a deal at any cost, and deep distrust of his unpredictability and willingness to take Ukraine’s interests into account.
A paradox emerged in public opinion, somewhat reminiscent of the effect of Trump’s endorsement of Viktor Orbán during Hungary's election campaign. According to polling by Medián, as many as 83% of Hungarians expected foreign interference in the election. Against that backdrop, Trump’s open support for Orbán and JD Vance’s visit landed in an already highly sensitive debate over outside influence and significantly weakened Orbán’s position: polls by Medián and Republikon showed Fidesz trailing the opposition by a noticeable margin.
In retrospect, we probably should have framed the second scenario around security guarantees from European countries rather than from the United States.
In Ukraine, the first two scenarios – those involving either a border fixed along the line of contact or a demilitarised western Donbas, combined with security guarantees from the United States- support was lost compared with the previous year, largely because of the Trump factor. A ceasefire offered under American sponsorship had lost much of its appeal.
The third scenario – where security was guaranteed by “Western countries,” a potentially more acceptable formula – failed because the requirement that Ukrainian troops withdraw from Donbas outweighed any positive effect of those guarantees.
Over the course of these two waves, we gained a much better understanding of how to work with scenario parameters and account for political context, and next time we should be able to offer more precise recommendations for designing a ceasefire agreement. The study also brought to light another important feature of how ceasefire terms are perceived: attitudes depend not only on the substance of the proposal, but also on who puts it forward and who is expected to guarantee its implementation.
The KIIS data support the broader point that the same peace initiative can be interpreted by the public in very different ways – as either a step toward peace or a sign of weakness. The ExtremeScan study reveals the same effect at the level of mechanism: trust in the mediator of the negotiations directly shapes people’s willingness to accept a given scenario, either boosting support for it or undermining it.
At the same time, the relatively modest figures in Ukraine should not be read as evidence that Ukrainians are unwilling to accept a ceasefire in principle. What they show, rather, is that if a ceasefire comes to look credible – that is, if Volodymyr Zelensky, acting in concert with European countries (and perhaps aided by at least a temporary moment of clarity from Trump), plays a greater role in shaping it – Ukrainians are likely to view the very same terms more favourably, much as they did a year ago.
Conclusion: There is room for compromise
In conclusion, it is important to stress that our aim was not to produce a “recipe for peace”, but rather to identify the range of compromises that might be acceptable to populations on both sides of the conflict. Our goal was to soberly compare the national and state “super-values” invoked in political rhetoric with the actual preferences, priorities, and expectations of ordinary people.
The findings suggest that these stated priorities do not necessarily align with people’s actual preferences and expectations. Some goals presented as unquestionably paramount turn out, in public opinion, to be more open to compromise than official rhetoric would suggest. In Russia, for example, the idea of securing control over the full administrative territory of Donbas at any cost ranks below the goal of ending the fighting. By contrast, security issues – including limits on military alliances such as NATO – are seen as far more consequential from the Russian perspective. Putin has the domestic political room to stop the war immediately.
For Ukrainians, by contrast, renouncing NATO membership – especially in its current form – has long ceased to be a matter of central importance, unlike for Russians. What matters to them is the material strengthening of Ukraine’s own defence capacity, rather than membership in a weakening alliance whose future role is increasingly difficult to predict. Ukrainian public opinion has matured to the point where an end to the fighting can be considered a legitimate goal in its own right, even if that means abandoning a military solution to the territorial question. What remains essential, however, is preserving the legal principle that a just settlement – as Ukrainians understand it – should still be pursued in the future, albeit outside a military framework.
Here, however, lies a clear red line: concessions over Donbas. On that point, Ukrainians are not prepared to compromise, either symbolically or in military-pragmatic terms. Even if Volodymyr Zelensky himself were inclined toward such a compromise, he has no political room to cede those 8,000-10,000 square kilometres of territory, settlements, and fortified positions.
It is important to bear in mind that any realistic ceasefire scenario in this conflict is bound to be asymmetric. This is a war triggered by Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, and no negotiating formula can erase that fact in the short term. It sets the basic frame through which any compromise will be perceived, and it shapes public opinion in the two countries in markedly different ways.
Even so, the study's central conclusion is that, at the level of public opinion, the overall picture has not changed: there are no insurmountable barriers to a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Despite differences in positions and in how the two societies understand the origins and causes of the war, there is still room for compromise.
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