Insurmountable Public Obstacles to Peace Agreement Between Warring Nations: None Exist
- Elena Koneva
- 4 days ago
- 30 min read
Updated: 6 hours ago
Release #35, April 4, 2025
Peace Studies
Ending a military conflict and establishing peace involves a specific state of public consciousness, which presents a particular challenge for researchers.
Our work was inspired by research that was optimistically called Peace Polls. This distinct opinion polling genre becomes an organic part of the peace process, which defines its name. The creator of this genre is English ethnographer and researcher Dr. Colin Irwin. In addition to his scientific merits, he possesses a unique profession with a difficult-to-translate name: "peace maker".
A strict ethical and methodological code governs the Peace Polls approach. One of its fundamental principles requires all parties to a conflict (including governments, civil society organisations, etc.) to be involved at every stage of the survey process — from questionnaire design to question formulation. This requirement is unfeasible for researchers studying the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Similarly, the free publication of results in a format accessible to both sides of the conflict, with government participation, appears equally impossible.
In this regard, inspired by the Peace Polls methodology, although we do not claim to implement them due to the absence of necessary conditions, we have attempted to conduct a study on ending the war. The main goal we set for ourselves is to analyse the public perception of the war and ceasefire and find a scenario that would be acceptable to the populations of Russia and Ukraine.
A key limitation of polls conducted in Russia is the difficulty of applying them in the current peace process. The Peace Polls requirement that we are dealing with a conflict in which the ruling groups and public organisations of the warring parties consider both countries' public opinion appears purely theoretical.
We are focusing on public opinion research, and the first challenge here is conducting a mirror poll of the populations of the warring parties. This is not our first experience conducting a "mirror" survey in Russia and Ukraine; the difficulty of balancing the meaning and sound of the questions is familiar to us.
We are sincerely grateful to everyone who helped bring this project to life - to our colleagues in both countries and to the political scientists on both sides who offered valuable recommendations and reviewed our questionnaire. We were able to hold joint briefings, and in those open, respectful conversations, we unexpectedly caught a glimpse of what a dialogue about peace might look like, even if only within the space of research-based impartiality. A special heartfelt thank-you goes to Ukrainian researcher Inna Volosevych. As an expert on public opinion in Ukraine, she helped us maintain balanced wording and analytical accuracy at every stage of the work.
War Terminology Characteristics
A significant proportion of the questions should be identical across surveys. However, the wording of these questions needs to be adapted for each side.
For three years, we in Russia and our colleagues in Ukraine have been researching the attitudes of residents from the warring states toward the conflict. In Russian surveys, we referred to it as a 'special military operation' — a term that was not only used universally in state and pro-state media, but was enforced as the mandatory designation for Russia's military actions in Ukraine. Avoiding this terminology for a considerable period constituted a criminal offence under the Russian Federation Criminal Code. More recently, criminal prosecutions under this article have become less frequent.
Even though the term "special military operation" does not correspond to the reality of an ongoing war, it has become natural for Russian citizens. State propaganda has spent enormous resources to make the concept of "special military operation" ordinary in everyday use. Researchers in Russia have been unable to use the word "war" in the Russian part of the study due to concerns about provoking respondents to end the interviews. Moreover, many questions would be impossible to ask using the word "war," as it carries an unambiguously negative meaning, especially in the context of Russia, which inherited the Soviet slogan "Peace to the World!" that has become practically synonymous with peacefulness. To ask "Do you support or not support Russia's war in Ukraine?" is the same as asking "Do Russians want war?" How can Russians support a war?
As some Russian researchers formulate, the question about "military actions on the territory of Ukraine" sounds more neutral than "war", but its shortcoming lies in the narrowness of its wording. "Special military operation" includes a broader range of elements of war, thus bringing the term "special military operation" closer to the notion of "war," the attitude towards which we have been researching for three years. In deference to the Ukrainian audience of our analysis, we use the term “special military operation " in quotation marks.
Due to the absolute asymmetry of the sides, where one side has invaded and continues to invade the territory of the other, and the other is defending its territory, the terminology must be adapted. Thus, in the Russian version of the questionnaire, we call the territories "newly integrated", while in the Ukrainian version, we call them "occupied".
Questions Reflecting Attitudes Toward the Truce
Another challenge was finding a practical approach and the correct formulation of questions.
Studying attitudes toward individual truce parameters provides certain information but can create a distorted representation of public sentiment.
Parameters isolated from the general context are somewhat artificial and cannot adequately reflect the real process of adopting a comprehensive peace agreement. For example, a question that simply mentions stopping the war and transitioning to peace negotiations without any preliminary conditions demonstrates high rates of "irresponsible" readiness for the onset of the desired peace
When researchers (Levada Centre) add territorial concessions to the survey, this immediately reverses the situation, and 75% readiness to support Putin's decision to end the military conflict transforms into 28%. The same happens in Ukraine: Ukrainians support a ceasefire and entering into negotiations. Still, if negotiations imply an official abandonment of territories, absence of security guarantees, 'disarmament,' and elections during martial law, the overwhelming majority opposes such conditions.
Here is an example of an essential experimental survey conducted by KIIS (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology). It details attitudes toward individual parameters and their role in possible ceasefire agreements.
Like in our research, KIIS identified the leading role of the security guarantee parameter.
The territorial issue is undoubtedly critical, but due to the unrealistic nature of reclaiming occupied territories at this point, a significant proportion of Ukrainians are ready to accept this reality de facto, without recognising it legally.
The issue of political sovereignty is expressed in the refusal, under pressure, to join NATO or the EU and the adoption of Russian as a second state language.
Applying a combinatorial approach, KIIS obtains approximately 100 sets of parameters (ceasefire scenarios) and assesses their acceptability. The study's authors warn about the non-representative nature of each set, as only about 20 people evaluated each.
A drawback of this complete combinatorial approach is the incoherence of certain combinations, such as "join NATO" + "lose sovereignty," or "no security guarantees" + "no sovereignty" + "regain all territory" + "make Russian a second state language." The mechanical permutation of parameters was an exploratory experiment, but it led to wasted responses, as some respondents were forced to assess irrelevant combinations.
That said, evaluating each parameter in the context of others can still be helpful — it helps estimate the "weight" of a condition within a broader package.
Attitudes toward territorial concessions clearly illustrate how isolated questions work.
Which of the following statements do you agree with to a greater extent?
Ukraine | |
To achieve peace and maintain independence, Ukraine can agree to refrain from military actions to liberate territories occupied after 2022 | 37% |
Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up on reclaiming its territories, even if the war lasts longer | 53% |
Difficult to answer | 10% |
Russia | |
To achieve peace and security along its borders as quickly as possible, Russia can cede PART of the newly integrated territories | 22% |
Under no circumstances should Russia cede territories occupied during the special operation, even if the special operation drags on and a new mobilisation is required | 68% |
Difficult to answer | 10% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
The KIIS study (as shown further) shows a high degree of unacceptability of Russian control over the occupied territories: 51%.
Ukraine. Can accept (predominantly without enthusiasm) | Ukraine. Categorically against / Package completely unacceptable | |
Control over the territories | ||
Russia maintains control over all occupied territories | 38% | 51% |
Ukraine regains control over Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, and Russia controls Donbas and Crimea | 50% | 38% |
Ukraine regains control over all its territories, including Crimea and Donbas | 57% | 30% |
Source: KIIS, March 2025
Looking at the above figures, which show a high degree of disagreement with territorial concessions from both sides, especially from the Russians, one might think that achieving a compromise peace agreement is impossible. However, as further analysis will show, this is not the case.
Factors Influencing the Perception of Peace Conditions
Trump's patronage undoubtedly influenced the high unwillingness to cede territories in the Russian Federation. Just recently, in September 2024, Russians were asked: "In your opinion, if continuing the 'special operation' requires a new mobilisation, what would be the right course of action: to conduct another mobilisation or to stop military actions and conclude a peace agreement?" - 49% of respondents suggested stopping military actions, while 29% favoured conducting another mobilisation.
Today, the situation has changed. The US military support system for Ukraine has broken down, and Russia has gained the opportunity to continue military actions at a "low cost" — especially since hope for a quick peace has not yet disappeared.
The "Trump factor" has also cooled Ukrainians' attitude toward NATO. According to a study by Info Sapiens conducted in early February 2025, 39% were willing to consider abandoning NATO membership in exchange for a truce. Over a month of Trump's activity and statements against NATO, this figure increased to 44%. This dynamic occurs due to decreased trust in NATO against the backdrop of Trump's rhetoric and because abandoning the intention to join NATO is accompanied by other conditions, such as alternative security guarantees.АТО обрастает другими условиями, альтернативными гарантиями безопасности.
In the ExtremeScan study, a "military contingent on the demarcation line" gives 62% support for the corresponding scenario, while "NATO troop deployment in case Russia violates the ceasefire" receives 55%.
Thus, both KIIS and ExtremeScan research show that the most acceptable truce scenarios for Ukrainians do not include NATO membership itself but reinforced, specific military support for Ukraine.
Acceptable versions of the security parameter, assessed by respondents from Ukraine (full versions of the scenarios are listed below)
Ukraine, accepting / not accepting | |
Scenario 1 | |
Ukraine refuses to join NATO, but if Russia resumes hostilities, NATO troops will enter Ukraine | 55/35 |
Scenario 2 | |
Ukraine receives real security guarantees from Western countries in the form of a military contingent along the demarcation line | 62/34 |
Scenario 3* The most acceptable option | |
Ukraine receives real security guarantees from Western countries in the form of a military contingent along the border line and modernisation of the Ukrainian army | 70/26 |
Scenario 4 | |
Ukraine becomes a NATO member | 66/28 |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
The difference is not radical, but it is meaningful.
In your opinion, what should Ukraine try to achieve at the peace talks in the first place? Choose two positions out of 4.
Ukraine | |
Obtaining security guarantees from NATO countries | 57% |
Liberation of occupied territories | 48% |
Increasing military supplies and assistance in the rearmament of the Ukrainian army | 43% |
Having Russia pay reparations | 34% |
Difficult to answer | 3% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
In spring 2023, only 18% of Ukrainians found it acceptable to refuse to join NATO for the sake of peace, while 76% considered such a price unacceptable.
Over the past years, NATO has embodied military assistance and security guarantees for Ukraine. Still, NATO's long-term denial of Ukraine and Trump's position on NATO itself are destroying this image. Today, more concrete support, not delayed by bureaucratic and political procedures, looks more important.
This is confirmed by the answers to all questions about military assistance and security guarantees.
Ukraine | |
Would you support or oppose President Zelenskyy signing a deal with the US to extract Ukraine's mineral resources in exchange for security guarantees from the US? | |
Support | 66% |
Do not support | 25% |
Difficulr to answer / refuse | 9% |
Would you support or oppose President Zelenskyy signing a deal with the United States to extract Ukraine's mineral resources even if the US does not provide Ukraine with security guarantees? | |
Support | 29% |
Do not support | 65% |
Difficulr to answer / refuse | 7% |
How do you feel about Donald Trump's proposal to exchange US military aid for the right to exploit Ukraine's mineral resources? | |
Agree | 38% |
Do not agree | 58% |
Difficulr to answer / refuse | 4% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
The KIIS study, which tested the strength of individual parameters in its experiment with equal representation of all possible items in different packages or scenarios, comes to the same conclusions.
Again, we see that rejecting NATO membership does not undermine the acceptability of the packages, while receiving military aid in the form of arms to the Ukrainian army is more competitive than NATO membership.
Ukraine. Can accept (predominantly without enthusiasm) | Ukraine. Categorically against / Package completely unacceptable | |
Security guarantees | ||
Ukraine refuses to join NATO; no peacekeeping troops or additional weapons exist. At the same time, Russia claims that it will not attack further | 44% | 44% |
Ukraine's NATO membership is postponed for 10-20 years. At the same time, Western peacekeeping troops are stationed in Ukrain | 47% | 43% |
Ukraine's membership in NATO is delayed for 10-20 years. At the same time, Ukraine receives all weapons in large volumes: air defence, aircraft, tanks, etc. | 54% | 35% |
Ukraine joins NATO | 49% | 38% |
Source: KIIS, March 2025
Significance of the NATO Parameter for Russia
NATO turns out to be no less of a trigger for the Russian audience.
In September 2024, when asked, ‘’In your opinion, what should Russia seek first in peace talks—retention of new territories or Ukraine's refusal to join NATO?" 46% chose Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, while only 26% prioritised territorial retention.
Five months later, encouraged by U.S. support, respondents slightly increased the priority of territories. However, refusing to join NATO in a situation of choice remains the primary demand for a peace agreement.
What should Russia try to achieve at the peace talks in the first place? Choose two positions out of 5.
Russia | |
Ukraine's refusal to join NATO | 41% |
Change of power in Ukraine | 37% |
Retention of annexed territories | 35% |
Disarmament of the Ukrainian army | 33% |
Lifting of Western sanctions | 22% |
Difficulr to answer / refuse | 7% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
The main anti-Western rhetoric in Russia is based on the image of NATO as the main enemy. Quantitative content analysis of statements by high-ranking Russian officials reveals a persistent negativity: 93% of all recorded political statements are negative towards NATO.
Peace Scenarios: Projecting Real Negotiation Processes
Our study's core — and largely experimental — part involved questions based on a scenario modelling approach. Each respondent was given a package of hypothetical conditions to simulate a potential negotiation. The first step was to define the basic parameters of these scenarios.
Based on prior studies and dominant narratives in both countries, the two most critical elements were: Territories and Security (for both sides, respectively).
We added two more: recovering Ukraine's economy and lifting Western sanctions on Russia. These last two conditions were included in all four scenarios in an unchanging format and served to balance the interests of both sides.
Economic recovery is vitally important for Ukrainians, and a reference to the future creates a positive context for the scenarios and for both Ukrainian and Russian respondents, as this wording suggests that reparations could be avoided.
As for sanctions, Ukrainians have consistently seen them as a core component of Western support throughout the war — part of the triad “arms, money, sanctions.”
On the other hand, despite denying a noticeable impact of sanctions on their own lives, according to many surveys, in September 2024, 65% of Russian residents expressed a wish to see the lifting of Western sanctions among their top priorities for the next year, and only 23% believed it would happen. So these two parameters — Ukraine's economic recovery and Russia's lifting of sanctions — balance the interests of both sides.
We could choose either to develop a whole range of scenarios — from the most pro-Russian to the most pro-Ukrainian — or to limit ourselves to a more realistic set of scenarios. However, since each respondent evaluated only one scenario (resulting in four separate subsamples), creating a full lineup seemed impractical. We therefore applied a realistic filter, selecting formulations that could be acceptable to the parties as starting positions during the negotiation phase. Given that the probability of Russia returning all the occupied territories remains low, we included a limited option, mentioning parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions in one scenario.
KIIS researchers found out: "If a package includes the return of control over the territories, it becomes much more attractive. For example, if Russia retains control over all occupied territories, 38% are ready to accept such a package, against 51% who are categorically against it. Although, of course, if the packages also include, for example, serious security guarantees and EU membership, the willingness to accept territorial losses will be significantly higher. Ukrainians perceive territorial losses as meaningless if Ukraine does not receive reliable security guarantees and prospects for future secure and prosperous development."
We constructed four scenarios for four random subsamples of the total respondents in each country. The scenarios were not the only goal: they acted as a lens through which we examined how combinations of different peace conditions might affect their acceptability to residents of warring countries.
Each respondent assessed only one scenario.
Politicians are now discussing various options for the conditions of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. How would you evaluate a peace agreement option with the following conditions:
Russia, accepting / not accepting | Ukraine, accepting / not accepting | |
Scenario 1
| 61/28 | 55/35 |
Scenario 2
| 60/29 | 62/34 |
Scenario 3
| 39/53 | 70/26 |
Scenario 4
| 32/58 | 66/28 |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
* The question about territories in the Ukrainian questionnaire was accompanied by a note, 'Even though Ukraine does not officially recognise this,' because in Ukraine, the official non-recognition of annexation is a matter of principle. When asking about 'giving up territories' in Ukraine, clarifying whether this means official renunciation or abandoning their recovery through military means is necessary. Without this clarification, respondents may interpret the condition differently.
In the second half of the field period in Ukraine, the question about territories in the third scenario was presented without the note about Ukrainians' 'non-recognition' of territories occupied by Russians: "Russia receives part of the territories it currently holds in Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Crimea."
The scenario's acceptability/unacceptability ratio has changed significantly, from 70/26 to 60/35. In addition to the wording, this may have been influenced by the meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy, after which the Ukrainians' sentiments radicalised (the wording was changed just after that meeting).
What is essential is that after three years of official rhetoric and sincere people's readiness to fight for the territories, Ukrainians are ready to accept the temporary loss of territories to stop the bloodshed and preserve the state. However, this does not imply a "peace at any price" position or capitulation readiness.
It is important to note that due to the "territorial" parameter, the scenarios are shifted to the pro-Russian side. Yet, the Russian responses show a significantly lower acceptance of the scenarios.
This is due not only to Trump's pro-Russian stance, which raised "victory" optimism. It also reflects the duality in how Russian respondents view the benefits of victory, the possibility of troop withdrawal, and the value of the annexed territories. On one level, expectations are shaped by state propaganda. On another, they are grounded in personal, everyday experience.
In your opinion, has the special operation done more good or more harm to you and your family? And for the country?
Russia | |
For oneself and one's family | |
More good | 25% |
More harm | 32% |
Has done neither | 30% |
Difficult to answer | 14% |
For the country | |
More good | 51% |
More harm | 32% |
Has done neither | 2% |
Difficult to answer | 15% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
Personally, neither respondents nor their families need any new territories. Respondents’ unwillingness to see the return of Ukrainian territories — or parts of them — when asked directly does not reflect their true value; by contrast, evaluating a comprehensive peace-agreement package in the context of achieving peace captures that value more accurately.
The Most Consensual Scenario
Of the peace scenarios formulated, the second scenario proved to be the most consensual.
Russia, accepting / not accepting | Ukraine, accepting / not accepting | |
Scenario 2
| 60/29 | 62/34 |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
Scenarios representing complex parameters will likely be the most effective predictive tool for studying the peace process: modelling perceptions of different negotiating positions and identifying the space of possible compromise. And we will continue this quest by modelling the negotiation process.
General Disposition Toward Finding Compromises
We compared the average values for all four scenarios, showing an integral index of readiness to accept (not accept) the assumed scenario and cease hostilities.
This 'index’ is interesting in terms of comparison: Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine before and after the meeting of Zelensky and Trump.
Ceasefire acceptability 'index' across all scenarios and the Trump factor
Russia | Ukraine pre-01.03.2025* | Ukraine post-01.03.2025* | |
Acceptable | 48% | 63% | 56% |
Unacceptable | 42% | 31% | 38% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
*On 28.02 2025, D. Trump and V. Zelenskyy met in the White House.
The comparison of indices shows that for all the shift of scenarios to the pro-Russian side, the readiness of Ukrainians to compromise is significantly higher, even after the attempt to publicly humiliate the President of Ukraine.
Russians' Attitude Toward the Truce
According to the "Truce" survey, 22% of Russians polled believe a truce is unnecessary. At the same time, 34% of this group are ready to accept the first or second scenario, which means that the radical opponents of the truce are only about 15%.
And yet, in a situation when most of the country lives outside the military reality and when propaganda broadcasts support for Trump, the spirit of offensives and victories, Russians in February-March are showing a slight increase in readiness to continue military action: until February 2025, 48-49% were willing to support the withdrawal of troops and transitioning to peace talks, despite the goals of the "special military operation" not being achieved, while 31-33% were not willing to do so. By March 2025, willingness had fallen to 45% and unwillingness had risen to 42%.
Do you support withdrawing the troops and transitioning to peace talks despite the failure to achieve the "special military operation" goals?
Russia. Pre-February 2025 | Russia. March 2025 | |
Yes, I do | 48% | 45% |
No, I don't | 32% | 42% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
The nominal support for the "special military operation" similarly wavered (from the presidential election to early February 2025, support for the " special military operation" was at 52%; by the end of February, it had risen by 5%).
Despite the general background of wanting peace, despite war fatigue (according to the "Ceasefire" project, half of the population in February 2025 say they are tired of war), even though the "special operation" has negatively affected the daily lives of 54% of respondents (9% reported positive effect, 32% reported no effect at all. Data from the "Chronicles" project), the idea of a truce now, a ceasefire for 30 days, and other "local" versions of stopping hostilities only evoke enthusiasm among 50% (vs. 41% of opponents).
This correlates, among other things, with the high degree of ambiguity in the communications of the negotiation process.
Since early 2025, only 7% of publications have expressed minimal support for negotiations or a ceasefire, while opposition to them appears ten times more frequently.
When truce discussions appear, they are often framed as temporary and unrealistic — either as a tactical pause allowing Ukraine to regroup and rearm or as a scenario inherently disadvantageous to Russia."
Ukrainians' Attitude Toward the Truce
It is evident that Ukrainians, despite the shift of all scenarios (as well as the real situation) in a pro-Russian direction, are significantly more inclined than Russians to sign a peace treaty.
This was hindered by the public meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump. It made a very negative impression (this is also visible in responses to other questions) and radicalised Ukrainians.
Ukraine. Pre 01.03.2025* | Ukraine. Post 01.03.2025 | |
To achieve peace and maintain independence, Ukraine may agree to renounce military actions to liberate territories occupied after 2022 | 40% | 33% |
Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up retaking its territories, even if the war lasts longer | 49% | 57% |
Difficult to answer | 11% | 10% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
*On 28.02 2025, D. Trump and V. Zelenskyy met in the White House.
Ukrainians demonstrate stability in their political views, significant maturity, and independence from their own government and situational peacemakers. According to KMIS data, Ukrainians show a “rally round the flag” effect: trust in the President increased from December 2024 to March 2025 by 15 percentage points, reaching 67%.
Despite being critical of government actions, according to the ExtremeScan project 'Truce', 82% of respondents support Zelenskyy's foreign policy activities and behaviour during negotiations, and 79% do not want to hold elections during martial law. Moreover, Ukrainians do not approve of holding immediate elections, even when Ukraine is provided with security guarantees from Europe.
The political maturity of Ukrainians is well characterised by their attitude toward the 30-day ceasefire; the Ukrainian side actively participates in negotiations, demonstrating goodwill toward a truce, and the country's population consciously supports this.
The attitude toward the discussed 'short ceasefire' was studied by KMIS in mid-March 2025. An absolute majority of Ukrainians ( 77%) support this proposal. However, this is not simply a desire for peace; respondents' motivations are diverse. Nearly half of those surveyed do not trust the Russian leader and believe that this is a way to show that Russia does not want peace or that Russia violates agreements. 18% consider the ceasefire primarily a step toward ending the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine, and 12% say that this step is a way to unblock military assistance. The remaining 18% believe that a short ceasefire would be a mistake and a manifestation of desperation by Ukrainian authorities in the face of the situation at the front.
In other words, Ukrainians perceive the proposal itself as positive, but observing the mediator's and the opposing side's behaviour, they have little faith that this is a genuine beginning of the path to peace on terms acceptable to Ukraine.
Geopolitics of the Truce
By the time the field research was conducted, about two months of ceasefire activity had passed, and it had been initiated by Donald Trump immediately after taking office. We asked a question about the influence of the leaders of major countries on the settlement of the conflict.
On a scale of 1 to 5, to what extent does the resolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine depend on each of the following? (1 = does not depend at all, and 5 = depends completely?)
Top 2: Share of those who gave a rating of 4 or 5
Ukraine | Russia | |
Volodymyr Zelenskyy | 72% | 41% |
Vladimir Putin | 67% | 78% |
Donald Trump | 61% | 94% |
Emmanuel Macron | 57% | 8% |
Xi Jinping | 41% | 18% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
It is not surprising that in the context of general Russian propaganda and the specific devaluation of the Ukrainian president's image as a participant in the negotiation process, his Russian influence rating on conflict resolution is so low.
Putin's rating approached 100%, and this reflects the understanding of Russians (and Ukrainians) that Vladimir Putin is the initiator of the war/'the special operation', military actions are taking place on Ukrainian territory, and therefore, he is the one who can stop these military actions.
In late 2023, on the eve of the presidential elections in Russia, some respondents of the qualitative study, explaining their intention to vote for Vladimir Putin, proclaimed their only wish was for him to end the war: 'Putin started the war, he should be the one to end it.'
Putin constantly talks about his desire for peace, blaming the Ukrainian side for sabotaging the peace process. And here is the result: in late February 2025, 80% of Russian respondents believed he was determined to make peace, and only 10% thought he was determined to continue the "special military operation.” This looks like a formal echo of officious rhetoric.
It took Trump's “peace campaign” and his loud statements about his willingness to end the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to strengthen the hope that the war would soon end. This manifested in a rapid rise in the share of respondents expecting the ‘special operation’ to end within a few months (up to six months).
When will Russia's military operation in Ukraine end — in a few months, in six months, in a year, in more than a year, or will it never end?
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Chronicles'. May 2022 to March 2025
For more than two years, from autumn 2022 to early 2025, just over 20% hoped that the war would end within a few months. At the beginning of February 2025, the number of such optimists increased to 30%, and by the end of the politically active February, it had already reached 43%.
Even though Ukrainians demonstrate a significantly greater willingness to conclude a peace treaty, their optimism regarding the timeline for ending the war is considerably lower, obviously due to their distrust of Trump.
In your opinion, when will Russia's war with Ukraine end — in a few months, in six months, in a year, in more than a year, or will it never end?
Ukraine | Russia | |
In a few months | 17% | 24% |
In six months | 15% | 19% |
In a year | 12% | 17% |
In more than a year | 21% | 15% |
Will never end | 12% | 6% |
Difficulr to answer / refuse | 22% | 20% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
The Trump Factor
Although initially the Trump factor strengthened hope for peace, the American president, with his unpredictable and biased behavior, is having the opposite effect on the willingness to compromise in both countries, radicalising both Russians and Ukrainians: the former through demonstrating evident favoritism, the latter through showing disrespect for the country's sovereignty and national leader.
Surprisingly, the perceptions of Trump by residents of both countries coincide. Both Russians and Ukrainians evaluate his position with a large margin as pro-Russian.
At the same time, Russians are not satisfied with Trump's consistency in defending pro-Russian interests, which is why, spontaneously, without prompting, a large proportion (32%) of respondents believe that Trump is protecting his own interests / the interests of the USA.
In your opinion, whose side is US President Donald Trump on in the ceasefire negotiation process: rather on the side of Russia or on the side of Ukraine?
Ukraine* | Russia | |
On Russia’s side | 72% | 43% |
On Ukraine’s side | 8% | 10% |
On the side of the US / his own side (option not read out) | 11% | 32% |
Difficult to answer | 9% | 14% |
* As of 01-04.03.2025, after Zelenskyy and Trump met at the White House.
Ukraine. The change in the context of the White House meeting
Before the meeting | After the meeting | |
On Russia’s side | 49% | 72% |
On Ukraine’s side | 15% | 8% |
On the side of the US / his own side (option not read out) | 19% | 11% |
Difficult to answer | 17% | 9% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
Against this background, it is not surprising that trust in Trump is uniformly low. What's surprising is that it's so low among Russian respondents. Even among those respondents who believe Trump is on Russia's side, only 30% trust him, while 60% do not.
To what extent do you trust Donald Trump?
Ukraine | Russia | |
I trust him | 12% | 20% |
I don't trust him | 84% | 74% |
Difficult to answer | 4% | 7% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
The nature of distrust is different for Russians and Ukrainians. Ukrainians cannot trust Trump because of his obvious bias in Russia's favour, combined with his obsessive yet hollow peacekeeping apologetics.
Russian distrust is based on Russia's long-cultivated anti-Americanism. While propaganda and official rhetoric have changed the record, and 60% of content since mid-February has been positive towards the US, this cannot quickly weaken the enemy archetype that has lived in the people's heads since the Cold War.
The distrust towards Trump is reinforced by the propaganda's erratic comments on his position, Putin's disingenuous stance on the truce, and, at the same time, constantly broadcast stories about their close contacts.
However, distrust toward Trump is not an obstacle to a general understanding of his influence on political processes since he has apparently triggered any ceasefire-related changes.
"Deterrence Forces" and Negotiation Participants
Both countries are first concerned about security guarantees after the truce. For the Ukrainians, the most desirable form of such guarantees is deploying a military contingent along the demarcation line. This raises the question: Who will fulfil this "peacekeeping" role?
Which countries' troops on the demarcation line could guarantee compliance with the peace agreements between Russia and Ukraine?
Ukraine | Russia | ||
Türkiye | 31% | Türkiye | 8% |
Germany | 35% | Germany | 4% |
Greece | 7% | Greece | 2% |
China | 11% | China | 21% |
UN deterrence forces | 36% | UN deterrence forces | 15% |
Military personnel from non-NATO European countries | 25% | Military personnel from non-NATO European countries | 12% |
Открытые ответы | |||
USA | 9% | USA | 2% |
France | 12% | France | 0% |
NATO | 5% | Other European countries | 2% |
Poland | 6% | Belarus | 2% |
UK | 15% | North Korea | 2% |
Baltic states | 3% | Arab countries | 1% |
Italy | 1% | India | 1% |
Sweden | 1% | Asian countries | 1% |
Finland | 1% | ||
Norway | 1% | ||
Other European countries | 2% | ||
Others | 5% | Others | 1% |
None | 12% | None | 25% |
Difficult to answer | 9% | Difficult to answer | 23% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
This question revealed not only a fundamental difference in the political perception of the proposed list but also a general disposition towards a truce and establishing a controlled peace: all the figures were significantly lower among Russian respondents. At the same time, the "none" and “difficult to answer” options were more than twice as high: 48% vs. 21%.
If respondents were unsatisfied with the proposed list, they could offer options. However, spontaneous responses about peacekeeping countries also showed a big difference: 15% in Russia versus 34% in Ukraine.
We got a similar picture on the question about negotiation participants.
Which of the following countries should participate in the peace talks, apart from Russia and Ukraine?
Ukraine | Russia | ||
USA | 74% | USA | 54% |
Germany | 68% | Germany | 20% |
Poland | 51% | Poland | 12% |
China | 37% | China | 42% |
Türkiye | 46% | Türkiye | 17% |
UK | 66% | UK | 16% |
Hungary | 18% | Hungary | 16% |
Baltic states | 45% | Baltic states | 9% |
Открытые ответы | |||
France | 26% | France | 4% |
Other European countries | 4% | Other European countries | 5% |
Italy | 2% | Belarus | 3% |
Canada | 1% | Arab countries | 2% |
Finland | 1% | India | 2% |
Czech Republic | 1% | ||
Sweden | 1% | ||
Japan | 1% | ||
Slovakia | 1% | ||
Norway | 1% | ||
UAE | 1% | ||
Others | 5% | Others | 1% |
None | 2% | None | 9% |
Difficult to answer | 2% | Difficult to answer | 9% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
And again, there was a big difference in the numbers: in the Russia survey, all possible countries participating in monitoring compliance with peace agreements and negotiating countries received significantly lower figures than in Ukraine, except for China.
China appears to be a consensus participant in both negotiations and participation in the military contingent along the line of demarcation (even with a small percentage). The USA does not count, as they are participants by definition.
16% of respondents in Russia and 38% of respondents in Ukraine offered their own options.
Such a big difference may indicate the different degrees of involvement of the residents of two countries in politics and Russia's limited circle of allies, friends, and even neutral countries.
Strategic Orientation Toward the West or East
The world is sharply polarised, forcing people to think about their own country's place among major geopolitical camps. We applied individual questions to each country's sample: "What is strategically more important for Russia: good relations with Western countries or with countries of the East and South?" "What is strategically more important for Ukraine: relations with European countries or the USA?"
It's important to note that the Russians' perception of the world over the past three years has been deliberately restructured. In the situation of Western sanctions and growing isolation, Russians are being told about the value of a new strategic region — the global South and East — while simultaneously devaluing Europe's significance.
It should be noted that this work can be considered successful. When asked about what is strategically more important for Russia, 17% answer that it's relations with Western countries, 34% - countries of the South and East (26% spontaneously said: "both").
Western countries are apparently predominantly associated with Europe, around which, especially in recent months, an enemy image has been formed.
"Of all recorded political statements, 89% were negative toward the EU, and 93% towards NATO. Europe is repeatedly framed as the “party of war," allegedly determined to prolong the conflict at any cost. This narrative is further reinforced by broader themes depicting the EU as a region plagued by crime, economic decline, and growing restrictions on free speech — claims designed to erode Europe's legitimacy in the eyes of Russian and international audiences.”
We observe high volatility in Russian public opinion and susceptibility to current political circumstances and propaganda narratives. For example, according to the Levada Centre, in September 2024, 16 % of Russians had positive attitudes toward the United States, while by February 2025, this figure had already increased to 30%.
In the context of Trump's active participation in "peace negotiations," anti-Americanism has certainly weakened, but not enough to overcome distrust toward the unpredictable U.S. president.
Ukrainian respondents were offered a choice between European countries and the United States. Despite the important role of the United States in the negotiation process, 70% named European countries, and only 13% named the United States. Both options were chosen by 15%.
It should be noted that this preference toward Europe is connected not only to the position of the American administration, which is working in line with Russia's interests. Ukrainians have long been oriented toward a European development path for their country; in fact, Ukraine's recent history began with the Euromaidan.
Europe remains a consistent choice for Ukrainians, and this was not influenced, for example, by Vladimir Zelensky's meeting with Donald Trump at the White House: the figures did not change at all, probably because disappointment with Trump had occurred even before the meeting.
What is strategically more important for Ukraine: relations with European countries or with the USA?
Ukraine. Changes in the context of the White House meeting
Before the meeting | After the meeting | |
Rather with European countries | 70% | 70% |
Rather with the USA | 14% | 13% |
Both | 13% | 15% |
Difficult to answer | 4% | 2% |
Source: ExtremeScan, 'Truce', February-March 2025
Key Findings:
For Ukrainians, the value of concrete security guarantee actions, such as the deployment of military contingents, is significantly higher than NATO membership, especially in the new conditions of high uncertainty about its future. Ukrainians have accepted the low probability of defending occupied territories and are willing to agree to their de facto alienation as part of a ceasefire package under current conditions. At the same time, the factor of official non-recognition of the annexation of territories remains significant, as it implies refusal to recognise Russia's "right" to annex territories and preserves the legal possibility of diplomatic paths for their return in the future.
For Russians, when forced to choose between security and retaining "annexed territories," according to our research, security remains the priority. Having a NATO country as a neighbour is fundamentally unacceptable, which is why Ukraine's renunciation of NATO membership is the basic condition for "Russia's security." Russians do not perceive Ukraine itself as a serious threat, since, according to Russians, almost the entire North Atlantic Alliance is waging war against Russia through Ukrainians. The "special military operation" as a standalone operation has shifted in positioning to a civilizational war of the West, the US, and NATO against Russia. The "new Russian territories " are so relative in value that about half of the population at the end of 2024 was ready to support Putin's decision to withdraw troops from Ukrainian territory. Crimea doesn't count, as it is a "sacred" territory. The "special operation" has exhausted resources for increasing its sustainable, consistent support, and temporary surges of enthusiasm cannot change the general downward trend. If the situation drags on and/or the US turns toward Ukraine, the locally increased willingness to fight for some time longer, defending annexed territories, increased support for the "special operation" in response to Trump's short campaign, could quickly turn into disappointment. As a result, a retreat to more compromising attitudes is likely: support for the "special operation" will return to the "pre-Trump" level, and the number of supporters for troop withdrawal and transition to peace negotiations will once again constitute the overwhelming majority.
Neither Ukrainians nor Russians believe in the effectiveness of a short-term ceasefire to achieve the goal of ending the war, considering negotiations hypocritical and useless. Both sides do not trust Trump, although they understand his initiative to start negotiations represents hope for a ceasefire.
The situation around possible ceasefire negotiations, Trump's patronage of Russia, and the current situation at the front have led to a temporary increase in support for the "special operation" and willingness to continue military actions aimed at securing additional territories for Russia. Simultaneously, due to the behaviour of Trump and his administration, there is a radicalisation of positions among Ukrainians, particularly regarding the refusal to reclaim occupied territories (increasing unwillingness), which nevertheless does not deactivate the readiness of the majority of the Ukrainian population to support a compromise ceasefire scenario. The Trump factor turns out to be ambivalent: it has given impetus to peace talks, but simultaneously works toward continuing the war.
We analysed two levels of truce: attitudes toward ending military actions and concluding a comprehensive peace agreement, and attitudes toward a short ceasefire. In Russia, only 15% of people are inclined to continue military actions. Despite the limited nature of the war on Russian territory, its consequences are growing, fatigue is increasing, so according to all sources, support for ending the war is high. The situation is more complex with Ukrainians: peace is much more desirable for them than for Russians, who have barely experienced the hardships of war, but peace is not acceptable to Ukrainians on any terms — desirability is intertwined with acceptability, and therefore, researchers always ask questions about peace in the context of conditions. This indicates that the attitude toward peace in Ukraine is not only strong but also more responsible. Regarding a temporary ceasefire, residents of both countries generally do not reject such a possibility, but view it with pessimism in terms of feasibility and expected effectiveness. Mutual distrust of each other, of the leaders of the opposite side, and of the mediator, the American president, devalues the value of such a pause in military actions — not to mention that the vagueness of the negotiation process and intensified shelling from both sides do not even allow imagining that this is possible.
It seems appropriate here to mention again a certain trap of consciousness that we fall into when we perceive or want to perceive the desire for peace as a consistent and uniform will of the people. There is no and there cannot be a pure substance of striving for peace. As research shows, in Russia and Ukraine, mass "support for ending the war" in itself says little about a unified understanding of what exactly stopping hostilities means. Behind this agreement are different motives, ideas about possible positive and negative consequences, and, most importantly, differences in what price people are willing to pay for it. The desire for peace contains a whole palette of motives: from rejection of war, sympathy for victims, desire for justice, to selfish unwillingness not only to risk oneself but even to experience everyday inconveniences. Diversity matters for in-depth research, building opinion groups, and identifying factors influencing support for war and peace. However, this does not change the fact that most people in both countries support ending the war.
The study's main conclusion is that there are no insurmountable obstacles to concluding a peace agreement among the populations of the warring countries. It is quite possible to prepare a compromise document on the main parameters of such an agreement that would be acceptable to most of the population of both countries. The only obstacles could be political will and the strategic plans of politicians. Possible references to "desires and will of the people, not allowing the signing of peace," as we see, are false. This applies to Russia, where official rhetoric influences the population's perception of the situation, but it does not coincide with people's desires. In Ukraine, the public narrative of the authorities and public opinion regarding war and peace demonstrates a high degree of coincidence.
The 'Truce' Survey
Fieldwork in Russia was conducted from February 20 to 26, 2025. Fieldwork in Ukraine was conducted from February 26 to March 4, 2025. From March 2 to 4, three additional questions about the meeting between D. Trump and V. Zelensky at the White House were added to the survey.
Russia
Sample size – 1,200 respondents. The survey was conducted using the CATI method (computer-assisted telephone interviews) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers. RDD, according to Roskomnadzor data, is stratified by federal districts and two federal-level cities. The sample is representative of the adult population of Russia (18 years and older) by gender, age, and federal district. The estimated sampling error is 2.81% at a 95% confidence level.
Ukraine
Sample size – 1207 respondents. The survey was conducted using the CATI method (computer-assisted telephone interviews) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers generated by RDD. The sample is representative of the adult population of Ukraine (18 years and older) by gender, age, settlement size, and region of residence before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The survey was conducted only in Ukrainian-controlled territories. The estimated sampling error does not exceed 2.8% at a 95% confidence level.