From Peacemaker to Clown: Trump in Ukrainian and Russian public opinion and in Kremlin discourse
- Elena Koneva
- Dec 8
- 10 min read
Article by Elena Koneva, published in Re:Russia, December 1, 2025.
During the election campaign, Donald Trump presented himself as a politician capable of stopping the war in Ukraine and triggered a surge of hope in both warring countries.
His first practical steps in this direction, however, produced a paradoxical result: in both countries public attitudes hardened in favour of more militant positions. Trump’s evident pro-Russian tilt legitimised the war of conquest in the eyes of some Russians and shifted opinion towards supporting its continuation. In Ukraine it generated mistrust towards Trump’s initiatives and led to a mobilisation of society, meaning a readiness to continue resisting aggression regardless of the circumstances.
Although perceptions of Trump’s pro-Russian stance began to shift gradually from May onwards, a persistent pattern of distrust towards him formed in both countries. His initiatives are seen either as unstable and unreliable in the eyes of Russians or as aggressively imposed in the eyes of Ukrainians. In Russia his behaviour is interpreted as unpredictable, ideologically inconsistent and driven by his own interests. Even among those who believe Trump is acting in Russia’s interests, 60% do not trust him.
This perception of Trump’s peacemaking is shaped to a large extent by the narratives promoted both by Kremlin-aligned media and by more emotional and radical bloggers and 'war correspondents'. The tone of commentary closely follows the Kremlin’s political assessment. When Trump’s statements align with its agenda, the reaction is positive; as soon as he diverges from it, the tone shifts dramatically.
Propaganda narratives contain no sign of preparing the public for the prospect of peace. A ceasefire, a pause in hostilities or direct talks with Kyiv are portrayed as a loss of national dignity and a concession to external pressure, while peace with Ukraine is depicted as unreliable and fraught with risk and instability. By contrast, a 'fair' and 'reliable' peace is associated with direct negotiations between Moscow and Washington in which Ukraine features not as a subject but as an object of bargaining. The Kremlin has been able to promote this media construct not only to the Russian public but also, with some success, to Trump and his entourage.
At the same time, Trump’s role as a peacemaker has been undermined by his wavering acceptance of this logic. Most Russians surveyed believe that Trump exerts a predominantly negative influence on global affairs and that, despite his attempts to prove otherwise, the United States is losing its influence in the world.
From hope to radicalisation
During the election campaign, Donald Trump presented himself as a politician who intended and was able to stop the war in Ukraine. This generated a certain surge of hope in both warring countries. At the beginning of 2025, respondents in both Ukraine (61%) and Russia (78%) were inclined to attribute to him a very high level of influence over a potential settlement of the conflict, according to an ExtremeScan survey (see Chart 1; unless otherwise noted, all references in this text relate to ExtremeScan telephone surveys conducted in February, March, September and November 2025. A description of the methodology is provided at the end of the article).
The high rating of Vladimir Putin’s influence over the prospects for resolving the conflict reflected the understanding among citizens in both countries that he was the initiator of the war or the 'special military operation' and that its termination depended primarily on him. At the same time, although Putin repeatedly spoke of his desire for peace while placing responsibility for sabotaging the peace process on the Ukrainian side, even Russians surveyed were not inclined to associate hopes for ending the war with him. In October 2024 and February 2025, 63% of those surveyed said they wanted a peace agreement with Ukraine to be concluded as soon as possible on the basis of mutual concessions, but only 36% expected such an outcome to occur (→ Re:Russia: The People and The Party Are Not United).
It was Trump’s forceful statements that triggered a surge of hope in Russia for a swift end to the war at the beginning of 2025. Surveys by ExtremeScan and Khroniki show that since spring 2022 Russian expectations regarding the timing of the war’s conclusion had continuously deteriorated. In late March 2022, 18% of those surveyed did not expect the war to end within the coming year. In June that figure had risen to 35%, and by February 2023 it exceeded half of all those surveyed. Only in February 2025, after Trump’s inaugural speeches, did the share of pessimists begin to fall, reaching 37% by the end of the month. At the same time, the proportion of those hoping the war would end in the coming months rose to 43% (see Chart 2). However, by the end of March, as the 'peacemaking process' began to go in circles, the encouraging 'Trump effect' had already largely run its course.
At the same time, Trump’s 'peacemaking', along with the hopes it briefly awakened, had an unexpected side effect in Russia. Throughout 2024 a certain balance had emerged between supporters of continuing the war and supporters of ending it as soon as possible. About half of all citizens favoured the rapid withdrawal of troops and a move to peace talks, even though the declared goals of the 'special military operation' would not be achieved. Against the backdrop of Trump’s mediation efforts, however, respondent attitudes shifted in a way that appeared paradoxical at first sight. The share of those favouring an early peaceful resolution of the conflict fell slightly from 48% to 45%, whereas the share of those favouring the continuation of hostilities rose markedly from 32% to 42%.
Trump’s peacemaking initiatives therefore expanded the constituency for continuing the conflict, even though Russians had become noticeably weary of the war. Around half of those surveyed acknowledged that the war was having a negative impact on their daily lives. A brief surge in militancy was also visible in support for the 'special military operation'. From January to September 2024, 50 to 52% of those surveyed expressed such support. In February 2025 the figure rose to 57% and only returned to 50% in September.
The image of Trump as a politician who 'understands Russia', does not describe it as an aggressor, is willing to negotiate and normalise relations with Moscow, and intends to scale back support for Ukraine increased the perceived legitimacy of the invasion in the eyes of some Russians. It also strengthened the domestic sense of military and political advantage. In other words, Trump’s 'peace initiatives' reinforced expectations of a more favourable outcome for Russia and of gains on the battlefield before the conclusion of a peace agreement with a Ukraine weakened by Trump’s policies.
While in Russia the shift in perceptions of Trump’s peacemaking messages developed gradually, in Ukraine the sharp reversal after the initial surge of hope was linked to a specific event, namely the meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Trump at the White House on 28 February 2025. This meeting was perceived as demeaning both to Zelensky and to Ukraine as a whole. As in Russia, this turn of events triggered a noticeable radicalisation of attitudes in favour of more militant positions. Before the Oval Office meeting, 40% of Ukrainians considered it possible to abandon offensive operations in order to secure peace. After the meeting, this share fell to 33%, while the share of those insisting on the full liberation of all occupied territories rose from 49% to 57%.
The perception of Trump as a politician exerting pressure on Ukraine and taking a pro-Russian position generated mistrust of his actions and initiatives and led to a mobilisation of Ukrainian society. This was reflected in rising approval ratings for Zelensky recorded by Ukrainian polls (→ Re:Russia: Ukrainian Rally in The Oval Office).
Peacemaking built on mistrust
The similarity of these radicalising reactions in both warring countries is not accidental. Survey data show a significant proximity in Russian and Ukrainian perceptions of Trump. In the first half of 2025 a large share of Russians and a majority of Ukrainians believed that he was broadly on Russia’s side. In March, 72% of Ukrainians and 43% of Russians surveyed held this view. This generated a persistent climate of mistrust toward his initiatives and toward a constructive role for the United States in Ukraine. In the second half of the year the situation adjusted somewhat. In the October survey, 52% of Ukrainian respondents believed that Trump was following Russia’s lead and pressing Ukraine to make territorial concessions. In Russia the share of those who felt that 'Trump is ours' fell to 32% in September and to 23% in early November after sanctions were imposed on Rosneft and Lukoil but before the latest 'peace initiatives' from Kirill Dmitriev and Steve Witkoff.
At the same time, both countries registered extremely low levels of trust in the US president. In Ukraine only 12% expressed trust in him, while in Russia the figure was about 20%, according to the March ExtremeScan survey. A poll by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) conducted in October in Russia adds further detail. Some 75% of Russians surveyed viewed Trump as shrewd and cunning, and only 5% as honest and sincere. Half believed that he makes decisions based on emotion, and only 19% believed that he weighs arguments carefully. Some 54% thought that Vladimir Putin does not trust Trump, and 56% thought that Trump does not trust Putin either. Only 18% viewed the US president positively, while 42% viewed him negatively, according to FOM data.
According to the September ExtremeScan survey, only 31% of Russian respondents believed that Trump was genuinely interested in a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, a very weak result for someone seeking the image of a peacemaker. Mistrust of the mediator on both sides of the conflict leads to his initiatives being seen either as unstable and unreliable in the eyes of Russians or as aggressively imposed in the eyes of Ukrainians. The latter see Trump as a threat to their sovereignty and fear an unequal agreement. Russians perceive his behaviour as unpredictable, ideologically inconsistent and driven by his own interests. Even among those Russians surveyed who believe Trump is acting in Russia’s interests, 60% do not trust him (see Table 1).
Total | On Russia's side | On Ukraine's side | On the side of the U.S./actibg in its own interests | Difficult to say/ Unsure | |
Total | 43% | 10% | 32% | 10% | |
Trust Trump | 20% | 35% | 1% | 7% | 15% |
Do not trust Trump | 74% | 60% | 95% | 86% | 71% |
Difficult to say/Unsure | 7% | 5% | 3% | 8% | 14% |
Table 1. Assessment of Trump's position on the conflict and trust in him, Russia, March 2025, % of those surveyed
This image of 'Trump the peacemaker', seen by respondents on both sides as highly influential yet little trusted, produces a demoralising paradox. Trump proved capable of triggering expectations about resolving the conflict but failed to become an effective mediator. He is perceived as an actor without a firm position of his own and as someone susceptible to manipulation. As a result, his statements serve more as a destabilising factor, introducing uncertainty and provoking additional reactive swings in public opinion.
From ‘peacemaker’ to ‘clown’: the spectrum of assessments of Trump in Russian media
A content analysis of 130 influential Russian Telegram channels with more than 100,000 subscribers and high publication activity, including state media outlets, political bloggers and war correspondents, provides an aggregate view of the Kremlin’s real stance towards the negotiation process initiated by Trump. Official Russian media retained a relatively neutral tone overall throughout the year, although when emotional judgements did appear, negative ones outweighed positive ones by a factor of two. Bloggers and 'war correspondents' publish more emotional content, yet their output also broadly aligns with the official wartime narrative and forms part of the wider propaganda ecosystem that supports the war.
In posts by bloggers and war correspondents, even in the early months marked by optimism about the revival of dialogue between the White House and the Kremlin, the balance of positive and negative assessments of a ceasefire tilted consistently against negotiations. In early March 2025, after the meeting between Russian and American delegations in Riyadh, only 7% of Russian Telegram posts expressed support for negotiations or for the idea of a ceasefire. By early November the situation had not changed. On average, positive posts still accounted for 7 to 8%, while negative posts amounted to 32% among political bloggers and 39% among war correspondents. Negotiations were largely portrayed as useless or even harmful, as a mistake by Russia and as a sign of weakness. This criticism was especially pronounced during the period of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul (see Charts 3 and 4).
The Russian media itself was more restrained, and initially the balance of positive and negative posts was almost equal, with 15,535 positive against 15,324 negative. Positive coverage included praise, support for Trump’s policies, and perceptions of him as a 'strong leader'. Negative coverage comprised criticism, accusations of weakness, or wrong decisions.
From January to April 2025, coverage of Trump himself and his actions was largely positive. His conflicts with Zelensky and early contacts with Russia provided an opportunity to portray him as a farsighted politician. Up until June, Trump was mainly depicted as a pragmatic leader capable of making a 'deal'. Even during this period, however, politicians and war correspondents warned of the dangers of 'naïve pro-Trump enthusiasm', asserting that Trump could not be trusted, that he acted in his own interests, and that he had designs on Russian resources.
By the end of May, the tone became predominantly negative, particularly against the backdrop of the Istanbul rounds of negotiations and Trump’s statements in support of Ukraine. In bloggers’ and war correspondents’ narratives, sarcastic comments appeared, such as 'Peacemaker Trump is over; now the war in Ukraine is Trump’s war' and 'This time it is not Trump funding Ukraine – it is Ukraine funding the hyperactive red-haired old man'.
From July onwards, negative coverage prevailed, with positive assessments appearing only in two episodes: 1 August, after Putin’s remarks at a meeting with Lukashenko that 'negotiations are always in demand and always important', and 16 August, following Putin’s visit to Alaska. After Trump’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 24 September, where he criticised Russia, the tone turned sharply negative again: 'Trump flips his stance on the fly'. In October, there was another brief window of warmer coverage following reports of a phone call between Putin and Trump and discussions of a possible meeting in Budapest. However, a week later the optimism collapsed: 'Mad Trump cancelled the meeting with Putin'.
Discussion of the US nuclear test plans announced by Trump in early November gave Russian Telegram channels a new opportunity for ridicule: 'A man detached from reality', 'The ageing peacemaker who cannot control his hawks', 'Red-haired madman', 'Crazy grandpa', 'Clown', 'Businessman'.
Thus, the tone of commentary closely followed the Kremlin’s political line: when Trump’s statements aligned with Moscow’s agenda, the reaction was positive; as soon as he deviated, the tone sharply turned negative. Behind this, however, lay a consistent concept that the Kremlin adhered to, unlike Trump, who had none.
Two ‘peace processes’ from the Kremlin's point of view
Russian authoritarianism does not ignore public opinion. The regime constantly monitors societal moods because it is interested in stability and reducing the risks of political protest. This monitoring, however, is not aimed at simply registering public sentiment; it is designed to actively influence it. Any political decision undergoes a stage of propaganda processing and sociological testing in order to prepare the population to approve it, or at least not oppose it.
Although paths to ending the war have been discussed throughout 2025 at Trump’s initiative, propaganda narratives show no evidence of preparing the public for the advent of a rapid peace. Rather, these narratives conveyed the image of a 'premature' ceasefire, which was generally understood as a loss of national dignity, a concession to external pressure, and a betrayal of the 'special military operation' goals. At the same time, these narratives contain a specific positive image of 'peace'.
On the one hand, there is the 'bad, unreliable peace', which is always framed as direct negotiations with Kyiv. Talks with Ukraine are portrayed as compromises, concessions, risky, and unstable. This sphere of instability also encompasses the 'unpredictability' of Trump and other Western actors. Peace that depends on the behaviour of chaotic leaders is interpreted as fragile and dangerous.
On the other hand, there is the 'fair, reliable peace', which occurs not when Russia and Ukraine talk directly, but when two 'truly responsible' actors – Russia and the United States – decide Ukraine’s fate as an object. In the Kremlin narrative, constructiveness, rationality, long-term decisions, and the 'architecture of peace' appear only on the bilateral Moscow–Washington track. Within this framework, discussion of the 28-point plan receives a positive tone: it is not a dialogue with Ukraine, but a 'grand deal' between two powers supposedly capable of ensuring stability, imposing rules, and guaranteeing results. A content analysis of a hundred publications in the last week of November shows that roughly 70–75% of materials portray Ukraine in an object role, while 15–20% allow for its agency, but in a negative or accusatory way, designed to provide examples and arguments demonstrating the futility of direct negotiations.
Thus, negative coverage of 'negotiations with Ukraine' and positive coverage of the '28-point peace plan' (and certain other Trump initiatives) form a single, internally consistent Kremlin media construct. A bad peace is one in which Ukraine is a subject; a good peace is one in which Ukraine is an object. This establishes a media logic in which any negotiations with Ukraine are pre-marked as unstable, conflictual, and weak, while negotiations between Russia and the US are presented as a constructive path to a 'durable and reliable peace' without Ukraine. The Kremlin appears to have successfully 'sold' this construct not only to the Russian public but also to Trump himself.
As a result, the Kremlin’s position, i.e. that of Putin, appears to the Russian consumer of this media construct as more 'responsible' compared with Trump’s 'vacillations'. In November 2025, 53% of those surveyed in Russia believed that Trump negatively affects global processes, and only 30% believed that he has a positive impact. This perception was in turn projected onto the image of the US more broadly. Despite all of Trump’s efforts to demonstrate the opposite, 50% believed that the US is losing influence in the world, while only 12% believed it is gaining.
Methodology
1. Survey data in Russia and Ukraine were collected through telephone interviews. In Russia, each wave surveyed mainly 1,600 individuals over 18. Sampling methodology: RDD based on Rossvyaz data, stratified by federal districts and two federal cities. Calculated sampling error: 2.44% at a 95% confidence interval. The dataset was weighted by gender, age, and federal district. In Ukraine, the sample consisted of 1,207 respondents over 18. The survey was based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers generated by RDD. The sample is representative of the adult population of Ukraine (18 and older) by gender, age, settlement size, and region of residence before the full-scale Russian invasion. The survey was conducted only in Ukraine-controlled territories. Calculated sampling error does not exceed 2.8% at a 95% confidence interval.
2. Content analysis was conducted on publications in Russian Telegram channels on two separate topics: 1) 'President Trump' – for this purpose, 102,373 posts mentioning Trump were extracted. Texts and comments were analysed using large language models (LLM); 39,466 posts clearly expressing attitudes towards Trump and his policies were retained for further analysis. 2) 'Peace negotiations and discussions of a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine' – 54,277 posts containing terms such as 'negotiations', 'ceasefire', and 'truce' were narrowed to a corpus of 38,809 posts that addressed negotiations or ceasefire efforts between Russia and Ukraine as the main topic. Posts were then classified according to two parameters: 1) attitude towards Trump or his policies: positive, negative, neutral; 2) attitude towards peace negotiations and ceasefire: positive (considered correct, necessary, useful, advantageous or justified for Russia), negative (considered harmful, premature, disadvantageous or unacceptable for Russia), neutral (no expressed stance).
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