From 1 to 5 March 2024, the ExtremeScan research agency conducted the fifth wave of electoral monitoring: a telephone survey of 1,000 Russian adults, using a representative sample, about their intention to vote in the Russian presidential election and their choice of candidate.
The fifth wave of electoral monitoring results shows a relatively high stability of voters' intentions.
Nevertheless, the voting parameters reflect the current situation quite sensitively.
Candidates’ recognizability
Putin's recognizability was not measured.
The election campaign did not affect the recognition trend of candidates with political experience, Kharitonov and Slutsky, whereas the ratings of the fresh candidates, Nadezhdin and Davankov, were on the rise. We did not exclude Boris Nadezhdin from the recognizability list because he continues to be politically active despite being excluded from the candidate list.
Intention to vote
Voting intention decreased after Nadezhdin was barred from participating in the elections. We would like to reiterate that these figures do not predict turnout.
Rating dynamics
The number of those who found it difficult to choose a candidate increased by 5-6 percentage points, from 19% to 24%, after Nadezhdin's elimination.
Putin's rating, which had remained at 66-69% for three weeks, fell to 64% in the fourth week of observation and remained at that level in week five.
There is a possibility that part of his electorate may have been affected by Navalny's death.
Kharitonov's and Slutsky's ratings fluctuated. Davankov's rating shows growth similar to that observed in the first three weeks of monitoring Nadezhdin's rating.
Quoting the first release:
“By publishing our rating data, we do not aim to predict the outcome of the vote, as we cannot account for the influence of special electoral technologies. Polling methods cannot measure such a shift. Besides, 24% of those who expressed their willingness to take part in voting have not yet decided on their candidate. Traditionally, their votes are distributed among all candidates in the same proportion as the votes of those who have indicated their preferences, but in this case, it would be incorrect.Obviously, these 24% of voters will not vote for the incumbent president. The first reason for this is that there is no resource for increasing publicity: this candidate is perfectly well known to everyone, and the assumption that Putin has not been named simply because he is not promoted enough does not look convincing. Secondly, as special studies show, the current election is presented to the voters' mass consciousness as "Putin's election", and an undecided position here means a direct refusal to vote for Putin. Thirdly, the last two weeks have shown a decline in Putin's rating, which will be difficult to compensate for to a significant extent.Our assumption: if all these undecided voters came to the polling stations, they would go to vote for an alternative option.
In other words, there are grounds to consider Putin's range of support levels (64-69% of those intending to vote) as the maximum one.
Comparative analysis of Putin's and Davankov's electorates
Kharitonov's and Slutsky's electorates are clones of Putin's electorate on most issues.
What is interesting is a comparative analysis of Putin's and Davankov's electorates.
It is interesting per se because the profile of Davankov's electorate is very close to Nadezhdin's electorate, which we have analysed in previous releases.
Age group
66% of Davankov's electorate is under 40. Putin has 28% of such voters.
Financial situation and education
Davankov's electorate bears two opposite traits. He has a large share of people whose financial situation has deteriorated over the last year and the largest share among the most wealthy respondents.
Like Nadezhdin, 60% of Davankov's electorate are people with higher education.
Putin's voters do not have an income profile that differs from "all the people". 66% of Putin's voters' incomes have not changed. This is stability.
Attitudes towards the special military operation and towards withdrawing the troops
Davankov's peaceful positioning is reflected in the data on his electorate's lack of support for the special military operation: 89% express no support for the special military operation, with 47% not supporting it openly and responding "I do not support it" (9% in the overall sample in this wave).
Putin has 32% pacifists overall, and only 3% openly say: "I do not support the special military operation".
Correspondingly, 82% of Davankov voters are willing to support withdrawal from Ukraine despite the goals not having been achieved, whereas only 33% of Putin's voters are willing to do so.
Tolerance for dissenters
Putin's and Davankov's electorates differ radically in their attitudes toward dissenters.
96% of Davankov's voters believe that there are people in Russia who have been punished criminally for their political views. Among Putin voters, this figure is almost half as high at 53%, but it is still a high figure. It could mean that half of Putin's electorate finds persecuting citizens for political reasons acceptable.
Davankov's voters are sympathetic to those who left Russia after the beginning of the full-scale war and never returned (88%). They are against criminal prosecution of people who publicly criticise the special operation (86%). Reciprocally, Putin's electorate condemns those who left (65%) and approves of criminal punishment for critics of the special operation (61%).
Attitudes towards Navalny's death
The voters of the two main candidates reacted differently to Navalny's death.
72% of Davankov's electorate and 11% of Putin's electorate considered the politician's death and funeral an important event.
They experienced a different range of feelings about the event.
